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Post-conflict situations face a high risk of reversion to conflict. We investigate the effect 
of military expenditure by the government during the first decade post-conflict on the risk 
of reversion. We contrast two theories as to the likely effects. In one, military spending 
deters conflict by reducing the prospects of rebel success. In the other it acts as a signal to 
the rebels of government intentions. In the signalling model, low military spending 
signals that the government intends to adhere to the terms of the peace settlement and so 
reduces the risk of renewed rebellion. We investigate the effects of post-conflict military 
spending on the risk of conflict, using our existing models of military expenditure and of 
conflict risk. We find that, consistent with the signalling model, high military spending 
post-conflict significantly increases the risk of renewed conflict. This effect of military 
spending is distinctive to post-conflict period, and becomes progressively more 
pronounced over the decade.    




During civil war government military spending rises sharply as a share of GDP. In 
previous work we have modelled military spending and find that on average a civil war 
raises it by about 1.8 percentage points (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This figure of course 
understates total military spending during conflict since it omits rebel expenditures. With 
the reversion to peace, the society therefore has the potential for a substantial ‘peace 
dividend’. Indeed, taking into account rebel spending, the scope for a peace dividend 
from reduced military spending is likely usually to be even more substantial once a civil 
war has ended than after an international war. However, peace after a civil war is often 
fragile. Using our model of the risk of civil war (Collier et al., 2003), we estimate that 
during the first five years post-conflict  there is a 44 percent risk of reversion to conflict. 
Any sensible government facing such high risks of civil war would tend to be cautious 
about rapid reductions in military spending. Further, post-conflict societies inherit at least 
one powerful military lobby, and quite possibly two if the rebel group is brought into 
government. Controlling for other characteristics, military dictatorships spend two 
percentage points of GDP on the military in excess of what fully democratic countries  
choose to spend, suggesting that where the military is powerful it lobbies for its own 
interest . Hence, the case for military spending based on prudent deterrence is likely to be 
reinforced by the atypical power of the military lobby.  
 
Whether for reasons of prudence or due to the power of the military lobby, the typical 
post-conflict country maintains military spending at a high level – the average post-
conflict level of military spending is 4.7 percent of GDP. This is only a little less than the 
5.2 percent of GDP of military spending during civil war and far above the 3.3 percent 
spent in peaceful societies. Thus, the government typically foregoes over three-quarters 
of the potential military expenditure peace dividend that would accrue were it to revert to 
the pre-conflict level of military expenditure. The issue we explore is whether high 
military spending is indeed prudent in post-conflict societies.  
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The issue is an empirical one because it is possible to construct plausible theories that 
predict opposing effects. Evidently, the most obvious effect of high military spending is 
deterrence through reduced prospects of military success for rebel groups. This is 
reflected in standard military success functions which model the chances of rebel success 
as a decreasing function of the size of government forces relative to rebel forces 
(Skaperdas, 1996). However, offsetting this, counter-insurgency to suppress a rebel 
movement in its early stages is much more difficult militarily than conventional warfare 
and risks alienating the local population. Incipient rebel groups often attempt to provoke 
the government military into ‘atrocities’ that can be used to strengthen recruitment. 
 
In our previous study of military spending we found that the net effect of these opposing 
influences on the efficacy of military expenditure was for high military spending to 
exacerbate the risk of civil war. When military spending was instrumented and entered 
into a conflict risk regression it was found significantly to increase the risk. In that work, 
however, we did not make allowance for the relatively rare and distinctive circumstances 
of post-conflict situations. Such situations are distinctive in at least two offsetting 
respects. On the one hand, as noted, they face radically higher risks of civil war and so 
may well be in the range in which military deterrence becomes effective. Especially 
where the civil war has ended in a decisive military victory, the post-conflict government 
may have learnt how to make high military spending effective. On the other hand, many 
civil wars end in negotiated settlements, often informal (Doyle and Sambanis, 2003). As 
Walter (1997) has argued, in contrast to international wars, the parties to a civil war 
usually lack effective means of binding themselves to respect the terms of such 
settlements. We argue that this creates a special role for post-conflict military spending as 
a signal of government intentions. We set out this theory in Section 2. In Section 3 we 
test the effect of military spending during different phases of post-conflict on the risk of 
conflict renewal. We find that the effects during the post-conflict phase are distinctive 
and powerful, and are consistent with a role of military spending as a signal of whether 
the government plans to adhere to the settlement. Section 4 concludes.   5 
2. Military spending as a signal  
 
Why do post-conflict peace settlements often collapse? If all conditions remained 
constant presumably the agreement would be maintained. Hence, in accounting for the 
collapse of a peace agreement, we need to look for changes in circumstances. Yet, the 
most evident change in circumstances is the economic recovery that commonly occurs 
post-conflict, and this should tend to reinforce the peace, giving both parties a stronger 
interest in avoiding disruption by raising its costs. 
  
One likely cause of renewed conflict is if the balance of power changes between the 
government and the rebels, so that what was mutually advantageous at the time of the 
settlement comes to be excessively favorable to the weakened party. During the post-
conflict phase a shift in relative military power is indeed likely. Maintaining a private 
army is expensive: the viability of a rebel group as an organization depends upon its 
continued access to finance. Typically, during a conflict, rebel groups use their capacity 
for violence to raise revenue: a common approach is through extortion rackets or other 
forms of predation on the high rents earned from natural resource exports. Once a 
settlement has been reached with the government it becomes much harder to sustain the 
rebel group as a fighting force. The leadership of a rebellion may well have been 
accommodated with positions in the government, prestige and income, but lower down 
the rebel organization fighters are in effect made redundant, usually with some pay-off. 
As a result, the longer the peace lasts the more the military capability of the rebel 
organization decays. This decay is much more pronounced than for the government army. 
After all, the normal state of government armies is to be at peace. They are organized so 
as to be financed without the need to fight, and to maintain a degree of combat 
effectiveness through training. By contrast, there is no example in history of a rebel army 
sustaining itself financially and militarily as a combat-ready force through a prolonged 
period of peace.  
 
A consequence of this differential erosion of military capability is that rebel bargaining 
power relative to the government gradually diminishes during the post-conflict period.   6 
This gives rise to a standard time-consistency problem: the government has an incentive 
to offer peace terms that, if the rebel group accepts, it is subsequently rational to renege 
upon. In her study of the difficulties of reaching sustainable peace settlements of civil 
wars, Walter (1997) concludes that it is the lack of mechanisms for the enforcement of 
the terms of proposed settlements that is the chief problem. The astute rebel group 
recognizes the potential for time inconsistent peace offers on the part of the government 
and so does not accept proffered peace terms, this being one reason why civil wars on 
average last more than ten times as long as international wars. However, the time-
consistency problem not only prolongs civil war, it contributes to the fragility of peace 
settlements. If rebels are insufficiently astute they can get caught out by the incentive of 
the government to over-promise. This need not literally be a matter of ‘credulous’ rebel 
leaders being fooled by a ‘sly’ government. The government leaders of the time may 
honestly offer terms that they intend to keep, but the next generation of government 
leaders may not feel bound by these terms, perhaps regarding previous leaders as 
foolishly generous in not anticipating how circumstances would change. Hence, a rebel 
group can find itself accepting a settlement that is subsequently modified against its 
interests.  
 
Perception is important here. As Hirshleifer (2001) has stressed, one cause of conflict is 
differences in perceptions between the parties: for example, each may be too optimistic 
about its own military prospects. By the end of a long conflict, perceptions may have 
been realigned closer to reality. However, if the balance of power shifts during the post-
conflict phase, the range of mutually advantageous terms changes in favor of the 
strengthening party and this opens the possibility of new errors in perceptions. The party 
that is becoming stronger may overestimate the new advantage and unilaterally change 
the settlement to the point at which the weakened party resumes the conflict. Or, the party 
that is becoming weaker might fail to appreciate the extent to which its power has eroded, 
and refuse to accept worsened terms that are still objectively mutually beneficial. 
 
If the military position of a rebel group post-conflict is gradually deteriorating, it needs to 
anticipate the extent to which this will be exploited by the government. At one extreme   7 
the government may be keen fully to exploit the potential for changing the settlement to 
its own advantage. At the other extreme the government might continue to adhere to the 
settlement despite the change in power. This could arise because the government 
perceives the costs of reneging upon a settlement as high: for example, it might fear that 
donors would reduce their aid. Alternatively, it could arise because during the peace the 
government gradually becomes more averse to war. For example, the composition of the 
government is likely to change from those with military interests to those with interests in 
economic and social development.  
 
Because these attitudes of the government are difficult to forecast, at the time of the 
peace proposal the rebel group does not know whether the proposal is time-inconsistent. 
The rebel group will use whatever signals of government intentions are available to 
screen out proposals with low credibility. Those conflicts that reach a settlement imply 
that at the time of the settlement the rebel group attached some credibility to the 
government proposal. However, given that the settlement is potentially time-inconsistent 
due to the erosion of rebel military capabilities, the rebel group will undertake a 
continuous process of post-settlement screening in order to get early warning of 
government intentions to renege. 
 
Many aspects of government behaviour post-conflict can potentially be used by the rebel 
group for screening. For example, the government’s rhetoric can be more or less 
inclusive. However, the level of government military spending is likely to be a powerful 
signal. If post-conflict government chooses sharply to reduce such spending, using 
revenues for other purposes, this may reasonably be seen as an irreversible decision.   
This action would be consistent with a government intention to honour the terms of the 
settlement, but may not be rational for a government intending to renege on the 
settlement. Thus, the choice of the level of post-conflict government military spending 
may well be characterized by a separating equilibrium, with a high level signalling an 
intention to renege, and a low level signalling an intention to honour the settlement.   
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If post-conflict military spending is a revealing signal then high spending might then be 
associated with a heightened risk of renewed conflict in three ways. First, high spending 
will be correlated with an intention to renege on the settlement, and reneging is likely to 
increase the risk of a return to conflict. This association will hold even if the rebel group 
does not use the level of military spending as a screening device. In this case, high 
spending would not directly cause a high risk of conflict renewal. Secondly, however, the 
rebel group might rationally use military spending for screening purposes. High spending 
would then indicate a government intention to renege on the settlement and the rebel 
group might then rationally pre-empt this intention before its military power deteriorated 
further. Third, recognizing that the rebel group would rationally screen by military 
spending, a peace-loving government might rationally signal its intentions by deliberately 
reducing military spending. In the two latter cases, a reduction in military spending 
directly causes a reduction in the risk of conflict.  
 
This signaling role of military spending post-conflict may potentially offset the deterrent 
effect. In the next section we investigate it empirically. In order to get as close as possible 
to the pure signaling effect, we control for the beneficial effects of reduced military 
spending on the economy. Evidently, due to these effects high military spending would 
indirectly tend to increase the risk of conflict. The issue is whether the direct effect – 
deterrence versus signal – reduces or increases the risk of conflict. 
 
We now formalize the above discussion. Consider a two-round game between the 
government and the rebel organization in a post-conflict setting. In the first round the 
government adheres to the peace settlement but chooses the level of military spending – 
high (H) or low (L). This sets the level of military spending not only for the first round 
but also for the second, reflecting constraints on the ability to make high frequency 
changes in spending. Following the government’s decision, the rebel organization decides 
whether to resume conflict. It chooses to resume conflict with a probability P. If it 
chooses to resume conflict, the war persists through both periods. Conditional upon the 
rebel movement having chosen to continue the peace, in the second round the 
government chooses whether to continue adhering to the settlement (A), or to renege (R).   9 
The government may have an incentive to renege on the settlement, because the rebel 
movement is militarily weakened by the act of settlement. Whether it has such an 
incentive depends upon its preferences which are not directly observable by the rebels. 
Thus, depending upon these unobservable preferences, the settlement may be time-
inconsistent. Following this decision, the rebel movement can again decide whether to 
continue the peace or to revert to war. 
 
In accordance with standard military success functions (Skaperdas, 1996), we assume 
that in the event of combat, military prospects are increasing in military spending.  If 
military expenditure is low rather than high we assume that any government incurs the 
extra costs of D in the case of war. 
 
The post-conflict government is potentially of two types: it may be indifferent to war or it 
may  be highly averse to war. In comparison with the war-indifferent government the 
war-averse government faces additional costs of conflict, C. 
 
Thus, the peace can collapse in either period, or it can persist through both periods. The 
risk of reversion to war in each period, Pij, is conditional upon whether the government 
adheres to the settlement or reneges, (i = A,R), and upon the level of military spending, (j 
= L,H). Recall that necessarily in the first period the government adheres to the 
settlement and in the second period it maintains the military spending chosen in the first 
period. If the government reneges on the settlement it can capture a bonus, B. 
 
First, we assume that if the government reneges on the settlement that this increases the 
risk of reversion to war conditional upon the level of military spending. There are various 
reasons why reneging on the settlement might increase the risk of war: the rebels might 
adopt a tit-for-tat strategy, or as discussed above, one side or other might be making a 
mistake. Thus: 
 
 PRL > PAL         (1) 
PRH > PAH.         (2)   10 
 
Second, we allow military spending to have a deterrence effect, conditional upon the 
provocation that the government reneges on the settlement. If the government reneges, 
there will surely be pressures within the rebel movement for a return to fighting, but a 
sufficiently high level of military spending may intimidate the rebels and so preserve the 
peace. Thus: 
 
 PRL > PRH.         (3) 
 
Third, we assume that the rebels use the government’s choice of military spending as a 
screening device to infer government intentions, conditional upon it being rational to do 
so. If the rebels behave in this way, then low military spending will deter the rebels from 
a return to combat so that: 
 
PAH > PAL.         (4) 
 
Our approach now is to determine the conditions under which the level of military 
spending can indeed support a separating equilibrium so that a rational rebel group would 
use it as a screening device. 
 
The government thus faces the choices of high or low military spending, and adherence 
to the settlement or reneging. We now set out the conditions under which a war-averse 
government will prefer low military spending and continued adherence to the settlement, 
whereas a war-indifferent government will prefer to renege upon the settlement and 
therefore will choose high military spending, even though this reveals its type.  
 
We first consider the pay-offs to different strategies for the war-indifferent government. 
By construction, these are straightforward and yield a clear dominant strategy. The 
baseline strategy, which yields a payoff of zero, is to adopt a high level of military 
spending but to adhere to the settlement. The strategy option is to adhere to the settlement   11 








￿             (5) 
 
This second strategy is thus dominated by the first. 
 
The third option is to renege upon the peace agreement while maintaining high military 
spending. This yields the bonus, B, with no offsetting costs. This strategy thus dominates 
the first strategy.  
 
Finally, the government could renege on the settlement while maintaining low military 








￿          (6) 
 
This is strictly less than the third strategy. Hence, the war-indifferent government will 
adopt high military spending and renege on the settlement as its preferred strategy. 
 
Now consider the pay-offs to same four options for the war-averse government. Unlike 
the war-indifferent government, no strategy is unambiguously dominant; the best strategy 
depends upon the degree of aversion to war.  
 
If the government adheres to the settlement and adopts a high-level of military spending, 




￿PAH.          (6) 
 
If the government adheres to the settlement but adopts a low level of military spending 
the pay-off is: 













AL            (7) 
 
 
The strategy of low military spending dominates iff: 
 
D/C  < (PAH  + PAL)/ PAL.        (8) 
 
The RHS is the effectiveness of low military expenditure as a signal. As the government 
is made more averse to war – larger values of C – and as the signal of low military 
expenditure is made more effective, (8) becomes increasingly likely to hold.  
 
If the government continues to choose low military spending but reneges upon the peace 





AL -  (C+D) 
￿
￿
RL.        (9) 
 
The strategy of low military spending and adherence to the settlement dominates this 
strategy iff: 
 




RL – PAL )        (10) 
 
According to (1) the RHS is positive. The likelihood of this condition holding is therefore 
increasing in the costs of war, C. 
 
Finally, if the government reneges upon the peace agreement and has high military 





AH +  C
￿
￿
RH         (11) 
 
The strategy of low military spending and adherence to the settlement dominates this 












AH + PRH - 2
￿
￿
AL ).      (12) 
 
From (2) and (4) the bracketed term on the RHS is strictly positive, so (12) becomes 
increasingly likely to hold as C increases. 
 
Hence, if the war-averse government incurs sufficiently high costs from conflict, there is 
a separating equilibrium in which it chooses low military spending and adheres to the 
settlement, while the war-indifferent government chooses high military spending and 
reneges.  The level of military spending in this case reveals the type of the government. 
The war-indifferent government chooses high military spending even if it knows that this 
will reveal its type. The rebels can therefore use the level of military spending as a 
screening device, and the war-averse government can therefore choose low military 
spending as a signal. 
 
Of course, the analysis does not demonstrate that post-conflict military spending is 
necessarily used for screening and signalling. But it does show that if a war-averse post-
conflict government is sufficiently averse to renewed war, and a war-indifferent 
government gets sufficiently large benefits from reversion to conflict, the chosen level of 
military spending will be a good screening device for rebel organizations to distinguish 
between the two extremes.  
 
 




Our approach follows that of Collier and Hoeffler (2004). In that paper we also 
investigated the effect of military spending on conflict risk but without distinguishing 
between post-conflict and other situations. As in that study, we utilize our model of the 
risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a). This predicts the risk during a five-year   14 
period based on characteristics at the beginning of the period in question. The data are 
global subject to data constraints, for the period 1960-99, and includes 55 civil wars 
which in effect have to be assigned by the model across 750 country-periods. 
 
Military spending may also affect the risk of conflict indirectly, via its effects on the 
economy. Knight et al (1996) find that during peace military spending tends to reduce 
growth. In turn, we find that growth reduces the risk of conflict both directly and 
cumulatively, through raising the level of income (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a). While 
these two results suggest that this is one route by which military spending increases the 
risk of conflict, in this paper our focus is only upon the net effect of deterrence and 
signalling. The test conducted in this Section is consistent with this focus since the 
growth rate (lagged) and the initial level of income, are both included directly as 
explanatory variables. Any remaining effect of military expenditure thus controls for the 
effect upon growth and income.  
 
Military spending is likely to be endogenous to the risk of conflict: where the risk is high, 
governments tend to increase spending. In our previous work we have indeed found 
evidence for such an effect: the lagged predicted risk of conflict significantly and 
substantially increases military spending. Hence, there will be a positive association 
between military spending and conflict risk even if such spending has no effect on the 
risk. In our previous paper we deployed a new technique which enables the instrumental 
variables approach to be used in a probit regression (Keshk, 2003). In the first stage the 
endogenous variable is regressed on the instruments as well as the exogenous variables, 
and in the second stage these estimates are used in a probit regression. The coefficient 
estimates are consistent and the standard errors are corrected. 
 
Were there no problem of endogeneity, the investigation of military spending in post-
conflict situations would be straightforward. A term interacting a dummy variable for 
post-conflict status with military spending would simply be added to the regression. 
However, the use of such an interaction term in the context of a two-stage probit least 
square (2SPLS) is currently not feasible in IV programs. We therefore implement the IV   15 
approach manually, each step in turn. For the second stage this produces identical point 
estimates of the coefficients to those that generated through IV programs, but the 
standard errors are not corrected. As we show, however, our approach is likely to be a 




In column 1 of Table 1 we reproduce the core logit regression of the risk of civil war 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a). For present purposes the most important explanatory 
variable is ‘peace’ – the number of months since any previous conflict. This is negative 
and significant – conflict risk is much higher in the early years of peace. Just prior to a 
conflict, the typical country that experiences a civil war has an estimated risk of 22 
percent in the ensuing five years. In the first five years of post-conflict peace the 
country’s estimated risk of renewed conflict rises to 44 percent. All of the variables are 
fully discussed in Collier and Hoeffler (2004a) and will only be discussed here as 
warranted. In order to use a two-stage IV approach we switch from a logit to a probit 
estimation. In our case the first stage regression assumes normality in the error term 
(OLS), thus running a probit rather than a logit is the logical choice. In column 2 we 
reproduce the core regession as a probit: the change in functional form has little effect.  
 
In column 3 we introduce military expenditure. As in Collier and Hoeffler, (2004), we 
follow the instrumental variables approach, using five instruments for military 
expenditure. Three dummy variables proxy external threats: current engagement in 
international war, past engagement in the period since 1945, and finally the Cold War 
period. A fourth proxy for external threats is the average military spending of 
neighbouring countries, weighted by their GDP. The fifth instrumental variable measures 
the extent of democracy. Although democracy is generally not significant in the risk of 
civil war, it strongly influences the level of military spending: where the military runs the 
country military spending rises by around two percentage points of GDP. Column 3 
reports the two stage IV regression with corrected standard errors (for details of the 
procedure see Keshk, 2003). So instrumented, military spending is insignificant.    16 
 
In column 4 we repeat the regression of column 3 using the procedure which we will 
subsequently be using to investigate post-conflict effects. The purpose of the column 4 
regression is to establish that this procedure produces very similar results to the IV 
methodology. The only difference between the IV approach and that used in column 4 is 
that the standard errors are uncorrected. The same first-stage regression has been used to 
estimate military expenditure, and the results from this regression again inserted into the 
second-stage regression. As can be seen by comparing the two columns, the standard 
errors generated by this approach are very close to those of the IV approach. This gives 
us some reassurance that the estimated standard errors for the subsequent results will not 
be too inaccurate.   
 
In column 5 we investigate post-conflict effects. We define post-conflict as being the first 
ten years after the end of a conflict. We include a dummy variable which takes the value 
of unity if the five-year period under consideration includes years which are post-conflict. 
The dummy variable is significant and negative. This does not mean that post-conflict 
societies are at less risk than other societies, since the much higher risk that they face is 
captured by the variable ‘peace’. Rather, it is necessary to include the dummy variable 
itself in order to be able to interpret the next variable. This, the key variable of interest, is 
the interaction term between the post-conflict dummy and the military expenditure 
variable. This term is positive and significant, implying that in post-conflict situations 
military spending increases the risk of a reversion to conflict. The addition of these two 
post-conflict terms does not affect either the military expenditure variable or any other 
variable. This implies that in the post-conflict context military spending is significantly 
more adverse in its effect upon the risk of civil war than in more normal situations. Recall 
that the standard errors for this term are uncorrected and so, although they are likely to be 
close to their true values, there is a need for caution in the interpretation of the result.     
 
In columns 6 and 7 we try to pin down when during the first post-conflict decade this 
effect is most pronounced. We therefore divide the decade into its two five-year sub-
periods and create dummies for each period. In column 6 we repeat the analysis using   17 
only the first five-year sub-period. The signs of the coefficients remain the same as in 
column 5, but the variables lose statistical significance. Potentially, this is either because 
of something genuinely different about the first five-years of post-conflict, or because the 
sample size of pertinent episodes is necessarily approximately half that used when the 
post-conflict dummy is defined over a period of a decade. In column 7 we repeat the 
regression with the post-conflict dummy redefined on the second five-year period post-
conflict. Now the coefficient on military spending is again significant. We do not regard 
these results as very robust in view of the reduced sample size once the post-conflict 
period is divided, but if anything, they suggest that the problems induced by high military 




Our intention has been to test the hypothesis that military spending post-conflict is used 
by rebel groups to screen government intentions and is used by governments to signal 
their intentions. Although the above results do not directly substantiate this hypothesis, 
they are clearly consistent with that interpretation. Any alternative interpretations must 
accommodate two somewhat surprising findings. 
 
Firstly, the adverse effect of military spending is significantly stronger in post-conflict 
situations. This eliminates as explanations for our result most of the obvious routes by 
which military spending might be counter-productive. For example, a common argument 
is that because counter-insurgency is very difficult, military attempts to suppress 
rebellion tend to backfire: the government army commits atrocities against the civilian 
population and this facilitates rebel recruitment. Such an argument is implausible as an 
account of why spending in post-conflict situations is differentially counter-productive. 
Indeed, if anything, we might expect that over the typically long period of a civil war the 
government military would have acquired differential effectiveness.  The signalling 
hypothesis accommodates this distinctiveness: both the role of military spending as a 
signal of government intentions, and the need for an identifiable rebel group to anticipate 
those intentions are far more likely in post-conflict situations.    18 
 
Secondly, the adverse effect of military spending on post-conflict risk becomes 
increasingly important during the decade. This eliminates as explanations for our result 
several other potential routes. For example, it is plausible to imagine that a military 
presence in fragile post-conflict situations randomly generates confrontations that trigger 
renewed conflict. The larger the military presence, the greater the risk of such events. 
However, as the ‘peace’ variable finds in our regressions, the overall risks of peace 
gradually decline during the decade. Were a military presence simply randomly 
exacerbating these risks, then its effects would be larger during the first five years of 
peace than during the second. Again, the signalling hypothesis accommodates this effect. 
During the first five years post-conflict, the level of military spending – at least as 
measured in our data set - is likely to be a less reliable screen of government intentions 
than during the second. First, an initial phase of high military spending may be necessary 
to cover the one-off costs of demobilization of combatants (Colletta, Kostner and 
Wiederhofer, 1996). Evidently, rebels should be able to distinguish between high 
spending for demobilization and high spending for combat capability, but we cannot: our 
data are for the level of military spending, not its composition. Secondly, high spending 
might simply indicate inertia. In most post-conflict societies governments have poor 
policies and weak institutions across a wide range of issues, and so the failure to change a 
particular component of government spending in the first few years is not a good guide to 
intentions. However, if military spending persists in being high over the decade, it will 
increasingly stand out as an exception to a general pattern of reform: policies are not inert 
in post-conflict societies. A useful measure of policy and institutional change is the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment of the World Bank, which is an annual 
rating of countries on a five-point scale. It finds that over the course of the first post-
conflict decade the CPIA typically improves from 2.14 to 3.00. This is a very substantial 
change, approximately equivalent to the difference between the average sub-Saharan 
African country and the average South-Asian country. Hence, the signal value of 
continued high spending increases over time. 
   19 
A simulation 
 
How powerful is the signal transmitted by the military spending decision? To simulate 
this we take the characteristics of the mean post-conflict country during the post-conflict 
decade: the period during which low military spending appears to be effective as a signal. 
At the beginning of the decade the average risk of conflict is 44 percent. Recall that for 
the typical post-conflict country military spending is only reduced by one-quarter of the 
increase in spending that occurred during the conflict. Specifically, average post-conflict 
spending is 4.7 percent whereas average peace spending was 3.3 percent and spending 
during conflict was 5.2 percent. Now consider the risks generated by the high-spending 
and low-spending strategies (see Table 2). We represent the ‘high-spending’ strategy by 
the decision not to reduce spending at all from the level prevailing during the conflict. 
Thus, the high-spending strategy involves an addition 0.5 percent military spending 
relative to the mean post-conflict country. Applying the coefficient on military spending 
found in Table 1, column 5, this would raise the risk of conflict from 44 percent to 47 
percent. We contrast this with a ‘low-spending’ strategy in which the government reduces 
spending to the level of the average peaceful country. By the same procedure this reduces 
military spending by 1.4 percent relative to the mean post-conflict country, and hence 
reduces the risk to 38 percent. Thus, comparing the two signals, the high-spending 
strategy raises the risk of reversion to conflict by around 25 percent relative to the low-




In this paper we have investigated the effect of government military spending on conflict 
risk in post-conflict situations. During a civil war government military spending is 
naturally high – typically around 5.2 percent of GDP, as opposed to 3.3 percent in 
societies with otherwise similar characteristics but a history of internal peace. The 
restoration of peace thus represents an opportunity for a peace dividend. However, in 
practice governments tend not to take most of this dividend. In post-conflict situations the 
risk of renewed conflict is disturbingly high – much higher than in countries with similar   20 
characteristics but a history of peace. Governments tend to respond to a high risk of civil 
war with a high level of military spending and post-conflict governments follow this 
pattern, presumably maintaining spending at high levels in an attempt to deter renewed 
conflict.  
 
We have found that such a strategy is worse than ineffective. Far from deterring conflict, 
high post-conflict military spending actually significantly increases the risk of renewed 
conflict. This result controls for the endogeneity of military spending to conflict risk and 
so cannot be accounted for as a spurious result of reverse causality. Further, this adverse 
effect of military spending is distinctive to post-conflict societies.  
 
Since we control for the level and growth of per capita income, the adverse effect of post-
conflict military spending cannot be due to its adverse effects on the economy. Though 
such effects indeed exist, they are additional to the effect that we have identified. We 
suggest that a possible mechanism by which military spending might be having these 
peculiar and distinctive effects in post-conflict situations is because of its role as a signal 
of government intentions. Specifically, military spending may be characterized by a 
separating equilibrium in which low spending signals a government intention to adhere to 
the terms of the settlement, while high spending signals an intention  to take advantage of 
the absolute deterioration in rebel military capabilities that occurs while the peace is 
maintained.  
 
Our results are of both practical and analytic interest. At the practical level they suggest 
that post-conflict governments might well be misguided if they perceive high military 
spending as an effective deterrent. Our results in fact underestimate the contribution of 
reduced military spending to peace. Other research has established that high military 
spending reduces growth, while growth tends to reduce the risk of conflict. Thus, the 
overall effect of taking a peace dividend by sharply reducing military spending is partly 
the direct effect on risk estimated in this paper, and partly the indirect effect via the 
beneficial effects on the economy.  
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At the analytic level, our interpretation of our results, emphasizing the time consistency 
problems that may be inherent in the negotiated settlement of a civil war, meshes closely 
with the work of Walter (1997) on the difficulties of concluding a settlement. She argues 
that the critical and distinctive difficulty in restoring peace during civil wars is the lack of 
credible commitment technologies: neither party can trust the terms of a proposed 
settlement even though it might be mutually advantageous. This in turn has practical 
implications for post-conflict situations. To the extent that the key problem is that the 
government lacks credible incentives to adhere to a settlement, the international donor 
community may be able to provide a solution. On standard grounds of poverty reduction 
there is a good case for substantial aid inflows during the first post-conflict decade 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004b). These aid inflows have the potential to serve a double 
purpose if ‘peace conditionality’ is incorporated. As suggested by Boyce (2002), aid 
conditionality could be used to reinforce adherence to the terms of a settlement.    22 
Table 1: The Impact of Military Expenditure on the Risk of Civil in Post-Conflict 
Countries 
  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Estimation 
Method 










               
ln GDP per   -0.950  -0.460  -0.607  -0.607  -0.619  -0.610  -0.620 
capita  (0.245)***  (0.124)***  (0.149)***  (0.149)***  (0.153)***  (0.150)***  (0.151)*** 
               
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.098  -0.051  -0.026  -0.026  -0.027  -0.030  -0.020 
   (0.041)**  (0.022)**  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
               
Primary comm.  16.773  7.407  10.325  10.325  10.179  10.219  10.276 
exports/GDP  (5.206)***  (2.456)***  (3.227)***  (3.154)***  (3.205)***  (3.171)***  (3.170)*** 
               
(Primary comm.  -23.800  -10.160  -15.904  -15.904  -15.655  -15.787  -15.582 
 exports/GDP)
2  (10.040)**  (4.630)**  (6.448)**  (6.370)**  (6.525)**  (6.432)**  (6.414)** 
               
social   -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
fractionalization  (0.0001)***   (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)*** 
               
ethnic   0.480  0.257  0.296  0.296  0.335  0.308  0.306 
dominance  (0.328)  (0.168)  (0.194)  (0.191)  (0.194)*  (0.192)  (0.192) 
               
peace  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
               
geographic   -0.992  -0.428  -0.937  -0.937  -1.016  -0.961  -0.973 
 concentration  (0.909)  (0.450)  (0.522)*  (0.506)*  (0.519)*  (0.509)*  (0.514)* 
               
ln population  0.510  0.247  0.305  0.305  0.318  0.306  0.315 
   (0.128)***  (0.063)***  (0.083)***  (0.082)***  (0.082)***  (0.082)***  (0.082)*** 
               
military         0.033  0.033  0.008  0.027  0.017 
expenditure        (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
               
Postconflict              -0.969     
 (1-10 yrs)             (0.436)**     
               
milex*post-             0.121     
confl. (1-10 yrs)             (0.070)*     
               
Postconflict                 -0.522   
 (1-5 yrs)                (0.520)   
               
milex*post-                0.068   
confl.(1-5 yrs)                (0.090)   
               
Postconflict                    -0.895 
 (6-10 yrs)                   (0.522)* 
               
milex*post-                   0.146 
confl. (6-10 yrs)                   (0.088)* 
               
pseudo R
2  0.22  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.25  0.26 
Observations  750  750  563  563  563  563  563 
Notes: Dependent variable is a bivariate indicator of an outbreak of civil war in any given sub-period 1965-69, …, 
1995-99. Following Keshk (2003) we correct the standard errors according to his two stage Probit least squares 
(2SPLS) procedure (column 3 only). All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   23 
 
Table 2: Simulation of risks for high and low military expenditure strategies  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (7)  (8) 











Ln GDP per capita  -0.6191  -0.9906  779  -6.5952  -6.5952  -6.5952 
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.0267  -0.0427  1.46  -0.0624  -0.0624  -0.0624 
Primary Com.Exports/GDP  10.1789  16.2862  0.131  2.1335  2.1335  2.1335 
Primary Com.Exports/GDP
2  -15.6546  -25.0474    -0.4298  -0.4298  -0.4298 
Ln population  0.3184  0.5094  23million  8.64  8.64  8.64 
Social Fractionalization  -0.0001  -0.00016  3200  -0.512  -0.512  -0.512 
Ethnic Dominance  0.3354  0.53664  0.429  0.2302  0.2302  0.2302 
Geographic Concentration  -1.0163  -1.6261  0.563  -0.9155  -0.9155  -0.9155 
Peace Duration  -0.0028  -0.0045  1  -0.0045  -0.0045  -0.0045 
Constant  -1.3269  -2.1230  19.8  -2.1230  -2.1230  -2.1230 
Military expenditure  0.0078  0.0125  4.7  0.0587  0.0412  0.0649 
Milex* post-conflict  0.1212  0.1939    0.9114  0.6399  1.0084 
postconflict1-10  -0.9692  -1.5507    -1.5507  -1.5507  -1.5507 














￿         -0.2238  -0.5127  -0.1206 




Simulation Technique used for Table 2: 
 
In Collier and Hoeffler (2004a) we estimate the probability of a war breaking out during 
a five-year period, and the model can be written in the following general form: 
 
  , 1 it it i t i it Y a bX cM dZ u - = + + + + ,                                                                    (A1)  
 
where t and i are time and country indicators. We use a logit to estimate the parameters. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a war broke out during 
the five-year period, so that Yit is the log odds of war. However, in this paper we use a 
probit to estimate the model and we apply Amemiya's parameter to convert the probit 
estimates into approximate logit coefficients. Specifically, divide the probit estimates by 
0.625 (Amemiya, 1981). The explanatory variables Xit are either measured at the 
beginning of the period (for example, income per capita, primary commodity 
exports/gross domestic product [GDP], population), or during the previous five-year 
period, Mit-1,  (for instance, per capita income growth, or are time invariant or changing 
slowly over time, Zi,  (for example, social fractionalization). The error term is denoted by 
uit.  
The expected probability  ˆit p of a war breaking out can be calculated by using the 
estimated coefficients obtained from equation (A1): 
 
  , 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ it i t i it a bX cM dZ W - + + + =                                                                             (A2)  














.                                                                                          (A3)  
 
We calculate probabilities for hypothetical observations. For example, we find the 
average values for  i t i it Z M X , , 1 , -  for post-conflict observations. We then calculate the risk 
of a conflict breaking out in a postconflict country,   ˆit p , by applying equation (A3).    25 
  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Sample (n=563)  post-conflict 1-10 yrs (n=60) 
  mean  Std Dev  mean  Std Dev 
         
War starts  0.078   0.269  0.217  0.415 
GDP per capita (const US$)  4246   4095  1824  1513 
(GDP growth)t-1  1.704  3.458  1.161  4.969 
Primary Comm. Exports/GDP  0.149  0.135  0.134  0.089 
Social Fractionalization  1744   2023  2231  2317 
Ethnic Dominance  0.425  0.498  0.433  0.500 
Peace Duration  327.7  147.739  50.55  38.53 
Population (millions)  25.7  80.2  61.7  136.8 
Geographic Concentration  0.610  0.198  0.600  0.170 
Military Expenditure  3.355  3.312  4.037  3.387 
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Data Sources 
 
Most of the data used in this paper can be downloaded at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144. 
 
Democracy 
Measures the general openness of the political institutions, it ranges from zero (low) to 




Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964) 
we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This variable takes the value of one if 
one single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total population and 




Is a dummy variable which takes a value of one once a country was involved in an 
international war. Here we consider all international wars after WWII. The main data 
source is Singer and Small (1984, 1994). We updated this data set by using Gleditsch et 
al (2002), this resulted in the addition of two international wars (Ethiopia – Eritrea, 1998-
ongoing as of the end of 1999) and India and Pakistan (1999-ongoing as of the end of 
1999). 
 
GDP per capita 
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the 
Penn World Tables 5.6 (Summers and Heston, 1991). Since the data are only available 
from 1960-92 we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators in order to obtain income data for the 
1990s. 
 
Geographic Dispersion of the Population 
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country by country basis. Based 
on population data for 400km
2 cells we generated a Gini coefficient of population 
dispersion for each country. A value of 0 indicates that the population is evenly 
distributed across the country and a value of 1 indicates that the total population is 
concentrated in one area. Data is available for 1990 and 1995. For years prior to 1990 we 
used the 1990 data. We would like to thank Uwe Deichman of the World Bank’s 
Geographic Information System Unit for generating this data. He used the following data 
sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), 
Columbia University; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); and World 
Resources Institute (WRI). 2000. Gridded Population of the World (GPW), Version 2. 
Palisades, NY: IESIN, Columbia University. Available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.org/plue/gpw. 
 
International War   27 
Is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the country experienced an 
international war during the period. The main data source is Singer and Small (1984, 
1994). We updated this data set by using Gleditsch et al (2002), this resulted in the 
addition of two international wars (Ethiopia – Eritrea, 1998-ongoing as of the end of 
1999) and India and Pakistan (1999-ongoing as of the end of 1999). 
 
Military Expenditure 
Military expenditure is measured as a proportion of GDP, also commonly referred to as 
the defense burden. Data for 1960-90 was obtained from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and we used data from the Global Development 
Network for 1991-1999. We measure military expenditure is measured as the average 




This variable measures the length of the peace period (in months) since the end of the 
previous civil war. For countries which never experienced a civil war we measure the 
peace period since the end of World War II. 
 
Population 
Population measures the total population, the data source is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 1998.  
 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 
The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural 
resources. The data on primary commodity exports and GDP were obtained from the 
World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars.  
 
Social, ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization 
We proxy social fractionalization in a combined measure of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals 
from a given country do not speak the same language. Data are only available for 1960. 
In the economics literature this measure was first used by Mauro (1995). Using data from 
Barrett (1982) on religious affiliations we constructed an analogous religious 
fractionalization index. Following Barro (1997) we aggregated the various religious 
affiliations into nine categories: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, 
Eastern Religions (other than Buddhist), Indigenous Religions and no religious 
affiliation.  
 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that the 
society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a 
completely heterogeneous society. 
 
We calculated our social fractionalization index as the product of the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethno-linguistic or the   28 
religious fractionalization index, whichever is the greater. By adding either index we 
avoid classifying a country as homogenous (a value of zero) if the country is ethnically 
homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa. 
 
War Start 
We use mainly the data collected by Singer and Small (1994) and Small and Singer 
(1982). War start is a dummy variable, it takes a value of one if the country was a peace 
at the beginning of the period and war broke out during following five years, 1960-64, 
1965-69 … 1995-99. If the country remained at peace during the entire period we record 
a value of zero. A missing value is recorded if the country was at war at the beginning of 
the period. We record 78 outbreaks of civil war but cannot use all of these observations in 
our regressions due to missing data for some of the explanatory variables. 
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